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DETERMINING FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITY IMMUNITY
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Champaign- Urbana News Agency, Inc. v.
J L. Cummins News Co., Inc.
632 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1980)
Since its enactment in 1936 as an amendment to the Clayton Act,'
the Robinson-Patman Act 2 has been the subject of controversy. 3 Basi-
cally, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits any person engaged in com-
merce from charging different prices to two different purchasers for
commodities of like grade and quality when this price discrimination
has certain adverse effects on commerce.4 The intended purpose of this
antitrust regulation was protection of small businesses from the whole-
sale purchasing power of large chain store retailers.5 It was primarily a
response to the threat the large grocery chain stores posed to the in-
dependent grocers.6
Shortly after passage of the Act, the United States Attorney Gen-
eral issued an opinion proclaiming that sales to the federal government
were not governed by the Act's proscriptions because the federal gov-
ernment was not a "purchaser" within the meaning of the Act.7 The
legislative history8 of the Act also indicates that Congress did not in-
tend it to cover the federal government as a "purchaser." In the last
forty-five years, only a few courts9 have discussed this issue, and no
1. 15 U.S.C. § 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 (1976) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13, 13b, 21a (1976) [hereinafter occasionally referred to as the Act].
3. Early criticism of the Act is found in F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 554 n.80 (1962) [hereinafter referred to as RowE]; see also FTC v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 359-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting); E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN
PRIMER 14 (1970); Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act andAntitrust Policy.- A Timefor Reappraisal,
42 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1966); Note, Yes, Virginia, There is Still a Robinson-Patman Act (But Should
There Be?), 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 14 (1976).
4. The Act prohibits price discrimination which may have the following adverse effects on
commerce: [1] substantially lessen competition, or 12] tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce, or [31 injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them. These
adverse effects on commerce as well as the prohibition against price discrimination are found in
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
5. See ROWE, supra note 3, at 19-23.
6. See generally ROWE, supra note 3; Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, The
Struggle Between Independents and Chains, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1951).
7. 39-41 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936).
8. See text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
9. Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. N.Y.), a'dper curiam, 234
F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1955) (doubtful whether the Act applies to whiskey sales to state liquor commis-
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court has expressly held that purchases made by federal government
agencies or instrumentalities are exempt from the Act.
In Champaign- Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J L. Cummins News
Co., Inc. ,1o the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
was faced with the issue of whether the secretaries of the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service"I were immune from liability under the Act.' 2
However, to resolve this issue, the Seventh Circuit first had to deter-
mine whether AAFES was a "purchaser" within the meaning of the
Act. The majority found that AAFES was a federal instrumentality
entitled to an implied statutory exemption 3 and held that the secretar-
ies were accordingly immune from liability.
After a brief description of the organization and purpose of
AAFES, this comment will summarize briefly the legislative history of
the Act and then present two defenses to a cause of action under the
Act-sovereign immunity14 and the Parker v. Brown state action doc-
trine. 15 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Champaign- Urbana News
Agency, Inc., including the dissenting opinion, will then be reviewed
and analyzed. It will be shown that the majority properly concluded
that AAFES was entitled to an implied statutory exemption from the
Act. Finally, the impact of the Champaign- Urbana News Agency, Inc.
decision on government purchases in general will be discussed and a
legislative solution to the issues raised by the case will be considered.
AAFES
The Army and Air Force Exchange Service is an organization
sions of Pennsylvania and Ohio); General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 37 F. Supp.
598 (W.D. Ky. 1941), afdon other grounds, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942) (sales of bricks to Louis-
ville Housing Commission, a governmental housing agency, is not within the purview of the Act);
Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,054 (D. Utah 1974) (sales
of rocket fuel to rocket manufacturer not exempt from the Act merely because ultimate consumer
was the government).
10. 632 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1980).
11. Hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as AAFES. AAFES purchases goods from
wholesalers and resells these goods primarily to military personnel. The commercial operations of
AAFES are somewhat similar to those of a private retail chain store, but there are major differ-
ences. For example, sales are restricted to military personnel, profits generated support Army and
Air Force welfare programs and prices are set as low as possible. Id at 684.
12. The Seventh Circuit also addressed the issue of whether the "law of the case" doctrine
was applicable. See note 98 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 97-133 infra.
14. Champaign-Urbana News Agency did not sue AAFES directly, but sued the secretaries
of AAFES instead. The trial court had found that the secretaries were immune from suit on the
basis of sovereign immunity. Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Co.,
479 F. Supp. 281, 288 (C.D. M. 1979).
15. The dissenting opinion relied on this doctrine to support a finding of liability on the part
of the secretaries. See text accompanying notes 134-58 i.fra.
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under the joint command of the Army and Air Force comprising ap-
proximately 3,000 retail chain stores and 10,000 other types of facili-
ties' 6 found mainly on military bases. These stores are commonly
referred to as base gardens or post exchanges (PX). AAFES is an in-
strumentality of the federal government 17 and its major function is sup-
plying military personnel with food and other amenities at prices lower
than those found at non-military retail stores.' 8
As a non-appropriated fund activity,19 AAFES is entirely self-sup-
porting. Congress does not and need not appropriate tax dollars to
support its operation.20 In fact, of all retail operations in 1969, AAFES
ranked third in the nation in total sales (over $3.5 billion) behind only
Sears, Roebuck and Co. and J. C. Penney Co.21 The profits generated
from AAFES operations support Army and Air Force welfare and rec-
reational programs. 22
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
At the turn of the twentieth century, the conventional American
business distribution channel was manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer. 23
In the 1920s, however, large retail chain stores began utilizing their
large cash reserves, storage facilities and marketing techniques to
purchase greater quantities of goods and bargain for reduced prices
from wholesalers.24 Some of the chains simply bypassed wholesalers
altogether and dealt directly with manufacturers. 25 This enabled chain
retailers to reduce the prices of their goods and attract a larger share of
the consumer market.26 As a result, wholesalers and small business re-
16. 632 F.2d at 683. These facilities include auto repair, customer service, vending facilities
and movie theatres.
17. Both the majority and dissent agreed that AAFES is a federal instrumentality. Id at 688,
693. See Standard Oil Co. of California v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942) where the Court con-
cluded that post exchanges are "arms of the government deemed by it essential for the perform-
ance of government functions." Id at 485. Plaintiff, however, argued that AAFES was "in reality
a business enterprise" and therefore not entitled to any governmental immunity. 632 F.2d at 687.
18. Id at 684.
19. Id at 686.
20. Id at 683-84. 10 U.S.C. § 4779(c) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
No money appropriated for the support of the Army may be spent for post gardens or
Army Exchanges.
10 U.S.C. § 9779(c) (1976) provides similarly in part:
No money approp.ated for the support of the Air Force may be spent for base gardens
or Air Force EcanCges.
21. 632 F.2d at 683.
22. Id at 685.
23. See RowE, supra note 3, at 3.
24. Id at 4-5.
25. Id at 4.
26. Id at 4-6.
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tailers banded together to pressure Congress into enacting legislation to
protect their existence from the chain store threat. 27 Congress re-
sponded in 1936 by amending section 2 of the Clayton Act 28 with the
Robinson-Patman Act.29
Section 2(a) 30 of the Robinson-Patman Act specifically prohibits
any person engaged in commerce from charging different prices to two
different purchasers for commodities of like grade and quality when
this price discrimination has certain adverse effects on commerce. Sec-
tion 2(c) 3 1 forbids receipt of, payment of or price discounts for broker-
age commission when no brokerage services were rendered. Section
2()32 prohibits conscious inducement or receipt of a discriminatory
price.
The Act, however, was not intended to curb all price differentials
for it provides certain statutory defenses including a "meeting competi-
tion" defense.3 3 If a wholesaler's largest customer requests that the
wholesaler meet a tempting lower price offered by one of the whole-
saler's competitors, the wholesaler, in good faith, can meet the lower
price without also having to lower his price to his other customers.34
27. Id at 8-11.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 (1976) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1976).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 13, 13b, 21a (1976).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the Dis-
trict of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the
United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission,
brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except
for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or mer-
chandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or
other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is
subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the
person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976). This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited
by this section.
33. See generally Note, Meeting Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 90 HARV. L.
Rav. 1476 (1977).
34. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249-51 (1951). The court acknowledged this
could be "a matter of business survival." Id at 249.
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Section 2(b)35 of the Act provides a complete defense to a charge of
price discrimination when a price differential is made in good faith to
meet a lawful and equally low price of a competitor. The Act also
allows price differentials to certain institutions through an express ex-
emption for "purchases of their supplies for their own use by schools,
colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals and charita-
ble institutions not operated for profit. ' 36
Although there is no express exemption in the Act for federal gov-
ernment purchases, there are indications in the legislative history that
the Act may not be applicable to the federal government. The congres-
sional purpose behind passage of the Act was to protect small business
retailers and wholesalers from the power of competing larger chain
stores.37 Since federal government agencies would rarely compete with
private concerns in the market place, small retailer/wholesaler protec-
tion under the Act from federal government agencies would appear to
be unnecessary.
Adding further support to the notion that the Act does not apply to
the federal government, the Attorney General proclaimed, in a 1936
opinion,38 that federal government purchases are exempt from the Act,
because the federal government is not considered a "purchaser" within
the meaning of the Act.39 The Attorney General relied upon the prin-
ciple that government rights are not restricted by a statute unless the
statute expressly so provides.4 A few district courts have relied on the
Attorney General's opinion and have indicated that government pro-
curement is outside the scope of the Act.4 '
In 195142 and 195343 legislation was introduced that sought to
bring sales to the federal government within the scope of the Act. Two
35. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Upon proof being made... that there has been discrimination in price or services
or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case. . . shall be upon the
rSOn charged with a violation of this section.. .. Provided however, That nothing
rein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by show-
ing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or
purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the
services or facilities furnished by a competitor.
36. 15 U.S.C. g 13c (1976).
37. See Row, supra note 3, at 19-23.
38. 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539-41 (1936).
39. See generally RowE, supra note 3, at 83-84.
40. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947); Dollar Savings Bank v.
United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1873).
41. See note 9 supra.
42. H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
43. H.R. 3337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953).
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similar bills were again introduced in 1959" and 196145 that would
have brought purchases by federal non-appropriated fund activities
within the Act's coverage. However, none of these bills was ever re-
ported out of committee. Thus, there is strong evidence in the legisla-
tive history of the Act that it was not intended to apply to government
purchases.
GOVERNMENT DEFENSES To 'AN ACTION BROUGHT UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a long recognized" common law doctrine
which precludes suits against the United States government without its
statutory consent.47 In essence, sovereign immunity bars a court from
exercising jurisdiction over the government. However, when a suit
names government officials or agents as defendants, the court must first
determine if the suit is against the defendant individually or is, in real-
ity, against the sovereign.48
The Supreme Court enunciated a test to make this determination
in Dugan v. Rank.49 In Dugan, the Court reasoned that a suit is against
the sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public
treasury or domain or interfere with the public administration, or if the
effect of the judgment would be to restrain the government from acting
or compel it to act.50 Dugan involved an action brought by riparian
owners to enjoin officials of the United States Bureau of Reclamation
from storing and impeding the natural flow of water at a federal dam.5'
Under the circumstances of this case, an injunction would have inter-
fered with the public administration of the reclamation project by re-
quiring the United States to dispose of valuable irrigation water.52
This would have required the expenditure of public funds and also
44. H.R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
45. H.R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
46. For a review of the historical origins of the sovereign immunity doctrine, see L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 197-231 (1965); Borchard, Government Rerpon-
bility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17-41 (1926).
47. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-88 (1941); United States v. McLemore, 45
U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
48. See, e.g., Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882);
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
49. 372 U.S. 609 (1963). See also Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
50. In formulating this rule, the Court had combined principles from its previous sovereign
immunity cases, specifically Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)
and Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
51. 372 U.S. at 610.
52. Id at 621.
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would have deprived the United States of its full use and control of the
reclamation facilities." From these facts, the Court concluded that
since the United States had not consented to the suit, the suit was
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 54
Sovereign immunity is not a jurisdictional bar, however, when the
official's actions are beyond his statutory powers. 55 In addition, even if
the actions are within the scope of the official's authority, sovereign
immunity is inoperative if the powers themselves or the manner in
which they are exercised are unconstitutional. 56
PA4RKE, V BRowN:
The State Action 4'xemption
The second possible defense to a cause of action under the Act is
the Parker v. Brown 57 state action exemption. 58 In Parker, the State of
California had adopted, under the California Agricultural Prorate
Act,59 a raisin marketing program which restricted competition among
raisin growers in order to maintain and stabilize market price levels
and raisin supplies. The plaintiff, a raisin grower and packer, brought
an action to enjoin the state-appointed officials from enforcing the pro-
gram. He claimed, inter alia,6° that the state's program violated the
Sherman Act. 61
53. Id
54. Id The Court found that even though the suit was brought against the Bureau of Recla-
mation officials, the relief granted actually operated against the United States.
55. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947) (injunction to prevent sale of plaintiffs stock wrong-
fully held by U.S. Maritime Commission); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); See,
e.g., Crowley v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 981 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (action brought against Army
officials for wrongfully ordering plaintiff to active duty); Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 68
F.R.D. 641 (D. S.C. 1975) (action brought by tobacco growers against Secretary of Agriculture
and tobacco companies for conspiring to fix prices); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Eng'r of United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (injunction against federal of-
ficers for not complying with National Environmental Policy Act); Coalition for United Commu-
nity Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (action brought against Secretary of
H.U.D. for his actions outside the scope of the Model Cities Act).
56. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Georgia R.R. & Banking
Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
57. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
58. Although generally known as the Parker v. Brown state action doctrine, the phrase
Parker state action exemption will sometimes be used to refer to the effect that the Parker deci-
sion has had on the antitrust laws.
59. See 317 U.S. at 344 n.l.
60. The plaintiff also claimed that the raisin marketing program adopted under the Califor-
nia Agricultural Prorate Act was invalid under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
because the federal statute preempted the California Act, id at 352-58. The plaintiff further
claimed that the program was invalid under the commerce clause of the Constitution because it
illegally regulated interstate commerce. Id at 359-68.
61. The plaintiff claimed the defendant violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I
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The Court in Parker reviewed the legislative history of the Sher-
man Act and found that Congress, in enacting the Sherman Act, did
not intend "to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature. ' 62 The Court then concluded that an unex-
pressed congressional intent to restrain state activity could not be in-
ferred from the Sherman Act since the states are sovereign and only
Congress can constitutionally subtract from their authority.63 In es-
sence, the Court, as a matter of comity and based upon notions of fed-
eralism, concluded that the Sherman Act does not preempt state-
directed anticompetitive activity.
Since Parker, the lower federal courts64 have frequently utilized
the Parker state action doctrine in scrutinizing state anticompetitive ac-
tivity under the federal antitrust laws. Recent Supreme Court deci-
(1976), which makes unlawful "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ...." The plaintiff also
claimed the defendant violated section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), which makes it unlawful to "mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States .
62. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
63. Id at 351.
64. See generally:
First Circuit: George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth.,
362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966);
Second Circuit: Karlinsky v. New York Racing Ass'n., Inc., 517 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1975);
Fairfield County Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Narragansett Brewing Co., 378 F. Supp. 376 (D.
Conn. 1974);
Third Circuit: Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 317 F. Supp. 247, aft'd, 444
F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971); Morton v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa.
1968), afld, 414 F.2d 403 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1969).
Fourth Circuit: Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 339 F. Supp. 1391
(E.D. Va.), aff'd, 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1972); Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Bryant-Buckner Assocs.,
Inc., 372 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967);
Fifth Circuit: Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Gas Light Co. of
Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972);
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971);
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Larson, 257 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 879 (1958);
Sixth Circuit: Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Board, 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir.
1974); Export Liquor Sales, Inc. v. Ammex Warehouse Co., 426 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971).
Seventh Circuit: Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 944 (1961); Fox v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,359 (S.D. Ind. 1975);
Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockland, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350 (N.D. I11. 1974), aft'd, 516 F.2d 220
(7th Cir. 1975);
Eighth Circuit: Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Met-
ropolitan Dist., 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970);
Ninth Circuit: State of New Mexico v. Am. Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974);
Tenth Circuit: Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
dirm'd sub non Wade v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 371 U.S. 801 (1962);
District of Columbia: Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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sions,65 though, have refused to exempt certain state participation in
anticompetitive activity. The Court has announced that the anticompe-
titive activity must be "required, ' 66 "compelled, ' 67 or "affirmatively
expressed and supervised" 68 by the state, or "pursuant to state policy to
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service," 69
before the state action exemption will confer immunity.
The first case rejecting the Parker exemption was Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar.70 In Goldfarb, the plaintiff sought monetary and in-
junctive relief under the Sherman Act for a price fixing scheme
(minimum fee schedule) established by a private county bar associa-
tion. Every lawyer in the county adhered to this minimum fee schedule
because of the prompting of the state bar. The Court, citing Parker,
stated that the threshold inquiry in determining federal antitrust law
exemption for state anticompetitive activity was whether the activity
was required by the state acting as sovereign. 7' Since the State of Vir-
ginia had not required or compelled the establishment of minimum fee
schedules, the Court rejected the county bar's argument that its an-
ticompetitive conduct had been prompted by state action.72 The Court
also rejected the Virginia bar's argument that it was a state agency enti-
tled to sovereign immunity by indicating that the Virginia bar had ex-
ceeded its authority by joining in what was essentially private
anticompetitive activity. 73 Goldfarb thus established that a state instru-
mentality's anticompetitive activity must represent a legitimate state in-
terest to be shielded by the Parker state action exemption.
The second rejection of the Parker state action exemption came in
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 74 In Cantor, a drugstore owner brought a
Sherman Act antitrust action against an electric utility for the utility's
illegal tie-in program (exchanging free light bulbs for burnt-out ones as
part of its electric service). The light bulb program was optional, but
once chosen it was subject to the approval of the state regulatory com-
mission. However, since the state had not required the program, the
65. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
66. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
67. Id at 791.
68. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
69. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978).
70. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
71. Id at 790.
72. Id at 791.
73. Id at 791-92.
74. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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Court indicated that it was fair to extend antitrust liability to the pri-
vate party defendant who initiated it.75 The Court also concluded that
imposition of liability under these circumstances would not frustrate
any state regulatory interest.76 Under Cantor, therefore, not only is a
legitimate state interest required for Parker exemption, but the activity
also must be carried out by an instrumentality closely identified with
the state.
The Court further restricted use of the Parker exemption in City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 7 7 In City of Lafayette, two
cities which owned and operated electric utility systems brought a
Sherman Act antitrust action against a privately-owned utility claiming
that the defendant conspired to restrain trade and monopolize electric
power. The private company defendant counterclaimed that the cities
conspired to restrain trade by engaging in sham litigation against the
company to prevent construction of its nuclear generaing power plant.
The Court refused to extend the Parker state action exemption to the
cities, concluding that the Parker state action doctrine exempted an-
ticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the state
as sovereign or by its subdivisions only when it was "pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public
service."' 78 The Court concluded that when the anticompetitive activity
is not directed or authorized by the state itself, the state subdivisions
must obey the antitrust laws.79 City of Lafayette, therefore, requires the
state, acting as sovereign, to impose or command the anticompetitive
activity before it will be shielded by a Parker state action exemption.
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on Parker state
action is found in Calfornia Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc. ,80 where a wholesale wine distributor sought an injunc-
tion against California's wine pricing program, claiming it constituted
resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. In determin-
ing whether the Parker state action doctrine immunized the state's pro-
gram, the Court indicated that Parker and its progeny have established
two standards for antitrust exemption: "First, the challenged restraint
must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the state it-
75. Id at 594-95.
76. Id at 596.
77. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
78. Id at 413.
79. Id at 416.
80. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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self."' 81 Since the resale price levels in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association were established by private wholesalers and the state's role
was merely enforcement, the program failed to meet the second re-
quirement for Parker exemption. Without adequate state supervision,
this program was essentially a private price-fixing arrangement and the
defendant was, therefore, subject to liability under the Sherman Act.82
Although one commentator has said that the Parker progeny have
left "both the bench and the bar awash in uncharted waters without
even a buoy, much less a beacon, to guide them,'' 83 one can still glean
from these cases that the likelihood of invocation of the Parker state
action exemption from antitrust liability is enhanced when the an-
ticompetitive activity is imposed or affirmatively commanded by the
state as sovereign;84 is subject to state review or enforcement; 85 repre-
sents a significant state interest;86 and is carried out by the state or by
an instrumentality closely identified with the state.87
CHAMPAIGN-URBANA NEWS AGENCY, INC. V.
J. L. CUMMINS NEWS CO., INC.
Facts and Procedural History
Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc.88 held the AAFES whole-
sale account for books and magazines at the Chanute Air Force Base in
Illinois from 1953 until 1975. Then, in 1976, AAFES switched whole-
salers and awarded the contract to J. L. Cummins News Co., Inc.8 9
after soliciting bids for that year. Cummins had underbid CU by offer-
ing AAFES a five percent prompt payment discount which had not
been offered to any other Cummins customers.
CU brought suit against Cummins and the secretaries of the Army
and Air Force in their representative capacities, alleging price discrimi-
nation, a violation of section 2(a)90 of the Robinson-Patman Act. This
section prohibits any person engaged in commerce from charging dif-
ferent prices to two different purchasers for commodities of like grade
81. Id at 105.
82. Id at 105-06.
83. Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1377-78 (1978).
84. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
85. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
86. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
87. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
88. Hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as CU.
89. Hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as Cummins.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). This section is set forth in relevant part in note 30 supra.
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and quality when this price discrimination has certain adverse effects
on commerce. In Count I of its complaint, CU sought treble damages
of $90,000, costs and injunctive relief against Cummins.9 1 Count II
sought a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 220192 to deter-
mine whether the Act applied to sales to AAFES. Count III sought
injunctive relief and damages against the secretaries for knowingly in-
ducing and accepting from Cummins a discriminatory price, a viola-
tion of section 2(f) 93 of the Robinson-Patman Act. The defendants
subsequently moved to dismiss the action, claiming that the Robinson-
Patman Act does not restrict the sovereign federal government.
The district court in granting the motions to dismiss, concluded
that AAFES, as an arm of the United States government, enjoys sover-
eign immunity from the Act;94 this sovereign immunity extends to the
secretaries. 95 The court also found that, since the Act was not intended
to apply to government purchases, a seller to the government such as
Cummins could not be liable.96 CU then appealed.
The Majority Opinion
On appeal, the primary issue was whether the secretaries could be
held liable for AAFES purchases which violated the Act. The Seventh
Circuit also had to decide whether a private vendor who discriminates
on the basis of price in favor of a federal instrumentality was liable
under the Act.
To establish that AAFES is a part of the government, the majority
began97 by reviewing the governmental organization, the purposes and
91. 632 F.2d at 681-82.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976) provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal
taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declara-
tion, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by
this section.
94. Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281
(C.D. II. 1979).
95. Id at 288.
96. Id at 291.
97. The court first addressed the initial issue involving the "law of the case." The first trial
judge, Judge Wise, had rejected the defendants' motions to dismiss; he subsequently went on
senior status. CU meanwhile had amended its complaint, adding a third count, and the defend-
ants renewed their motions to dismiss before a second trial judge, Judge Baker, who granted the
motions. The Seventh Circuit first stated that the "law of the case" was not entitled to the same
deference as stare decdr, and then concluded that the restraint on a second judge was one of
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the congressional recognition of AAFES. 98 The court then set out
some fundamental principles of sovereign immunity: that the United
States cannot be sued without its specific statutory consent;99 that no
government officer by his action can confer jurisdiction otherwise lack-
ing;l°° and that waiver of sovereign immunity of the United States
must be unequivocally expressed by Congress.' 0 ' The court empha-
sized that a court may not waive sovereign immunity. 0 2
Utilizing these principles, the majority stated that only Congress
could create a cause of action against AAFES if it is a part of the exec-
utive branch of government and that neither the secretaries nor any
other AAFES officers could, by their own internal regulations, subject
AAFES to antitrust liability. 0 3 The court then pointed out that Con-
gress had considered the issue but had not specifically made AAFES
subject to the antitrust laws. 104
The Seventh Circuit then addressed the parties' confficting inter-
pretations of AAFES' purchasing policy. CU had argued that AAFES
regulations required AAFES' contracting officers to adhere to the anti-
trust laws. In rebuttal, the secretaries argued that Army and Air Force
regulations required AAFES to purchase at the lowest possible price.
The majority, in attempting to reconcile these confficting policy inter-
pretations, looked to the fact that the antitrust laws themselves are not
in perfect harmony 0 5 and then concluded that if AAFES is immune
from the antitrust laws, AAFES officials cannot waive this immunity
through internal regulations. '06
comity only and did not infringe upon his power to act. The court found no abuse of discretion by
Judge Baker, who reached the opposite conclusion of Judge Wise, since the issue in Champaign-
Urbana News Agency, Inc. was one of jurisdiction, recognizable at any time. 632 F.2d at 683.
98. Id at 683-87.
99. For this proposition the court cited United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940)
where the Court stated: "[WMithout specific statutory consent, no suit may be brought against the
United States."
100. Id at 501. The Court said: "No officer by his action can confer jurisdiction." This
proposition was also followed in American-Foreign Steamship Corp. v. United States, 291 F.2d
598, 607 (2d Cir. 1961) where the Second Circuit said: "The executive arms of the government,
through which the United States does business, have no more power to extend by contract the
limited right granted by Congress than they had to create the original right of suit against the
sovereign."
101. 632 F.2d at 686. The court cited United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (the
Tucker Act does not create a substantive right allowing a wrongfully classified government attor-
ney to enforce a money damages claim for back pay against the United States).
102. Id The court cited United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654 (1947)
(judiciary lacks the power to award interest against the United States).
103. Id at 688.
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id
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The majority then presented its two major premises supporting its
conclusion that AAFES is entitled to immunity from the Act. The first
premise was based on the reasoning of Standard Oil of California v.
Johnson. 107 The Supreme Court in Johnson pointed out that Congress
had frequently recognized post exchange activity as governmental in
that the object of the exchanges was to provide convenient and reliable
sources where military personnel could obtain their ordinary needs at
the lowest possible prices. 0 8 The Court concluded that post exchanges
are "integral parts of the War Department, [which] share in fulfilling
the duties entrusted to it, and partake of whatever immunities it may
have under the Constitution and federal statutes."'109
The Seventh Circuit found Johnson's broad language indicating
that post exchanges perform governmental functions and partake of
governmental immunities persuasive in establishing that AAFES activ-
ities were governmental. This interpretation of Johnson has been fol-
lowed by a large number of courts. 0
The majority's second major premise establishing that AAFES is
entitled to immunity was based on House and Senate bills"11 which had
sought to amend the Act to include sales to non-appropriated fund ac-
tivities. These bills, under heavy opposition, " 2 were never reported out
of committee. The majority reasoned from this and the Johnson deci-
sion that Congress had never intended to subject AAFES to liability
under the Act."13
107. 316 U.S. 481 (1942). Johnson involved the validity of a California statute imposing a fuel
license tax on persons who distributed fuel to post exchanges (AAFES).
108. Id at 484-85.
109. Id at 485.
110. See, e.g., Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1974); Brethauer v. United States,
333 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Forfari, 268 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1959); Fraley v.
United States, 232 F. Supp. 491 (D. Mass. 1964); Parke, Davis & Co. v. G.E.M., Inc., 201 F. Supp.
207 (D. Md. 1962); Bailey v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 604 (D. Alas. 1962); Gradall v. United
States, 329 F.2d 960 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Pulaski Cab Co. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 955 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
111. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
112. 632 F.2d at 688-89. The court listed numerous individuals within the executive branch
who had strongly opposed passage of amendments to the Act seeking to include AAFES as a
purchaser. Among those listed were United States Attorney General Rodgers who interpreted a
1955 bill as being aimed primarily at AAFES; the administrator of the Small Business Adminis-
tration who opposed enactment of the 1955 bill, noting in a letter the importance of AAFES to
military morale; the Secretary of the Air Force who set forth in a letter the purpose of AAFES,
indicating that extension of the Act to AAFES would, in itself, be discriminatory because the
exchanges do not substantially compete with private business; in a letter to the House Judiciary
Committee the Secretary of Commerce opposed similar legislation, stating that the basic purpose
of the Act was to eliminate unfair competition among private entrepreneurs and that inclusion of
the federal government was inappropriate. Similar legislation was opposed by the Federal Trade
Commission in 1959. Id
113. Id at 689.
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The majority also pointed out that AAFES was not the type of
price discriminator which the Act was meant to deter.114 The purpose
of the Act was to protect small businesses from the power of the larger
competing chain stores. AAFES, however, does not compete in the
market place and, therefore, does not present the same concerns of un-
fair competition and price discrimination that exist between private
merchants.
The majority then summarily reviewed, distinguished and found
inapposite the cases relied on by CU. In the first of these cases, Paul v.
United States, 115 the United States had brought an action to determine
if California's minimum wholesale price regulation of milk could be
enforced against both consumption on military installations and resale
at commissaries and exchanges (AAFES). The Court in Paul made a
distinction between purchases of milk with funds appropriated to the
military by Congress and purchases made with non-appropriated funds
(profits from AAFES). The Court found that Congress, through the
Armed Services Procurement Act, 16 had preempted" 7 state economic
regulation of purchases by the military with appropriated funds, but
found no confficting federal policy restricting non-appropriated fund
purchases."l8 The Supreme Court concluded that state economic regu-
lations would be applicable to the non-appropriated fund purchases
(AAFES) if the state regulations were already in effect when the gov-
ernment acquired the land." 9 The Seventh Circuit, however, dist-
inguished Paul by pointing out that in Champaign- Urbana News
Agency, Inc. there was no issue as to whether the United States ac-
quired military land from a state encumbered with state regulations. 120
The majority next distinguished the Parker state action cases' 2 1 by
indicating that they all involved different issues and government bodies
other than the federal government. 22 The court also distinguished
114. Id
115. 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
116. 10 U.S.C. § 2305 (1976).
117. The Court in Paul used the term "exclusive jurisdiction" to indicate that Congress had
intended (through the Armed Services Procurement Act) to occupy the entire field of purchases by
the military when appropriated funds were used. 371 U.S. at 269.
118. Id
119. Id at 269-70. The Court remanded the case on this issue.
120. 632 F.2d at 691.
121. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. of Peoria, 557 F.2d 580
(7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992, reconsidered and aft'd as to antitrust issues,
583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
122. 632 F.2d at 691.
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Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. ,123 in which three entrepreneurs who at-
tempted to start a football franchise in Washington, D. C. brought suit
against the District of Columbia Armory Board, a federal instrumen-
tality, alleging that the board entered into a contract in restraint of
trade in violation of sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act. The facts
showed that Congress had created the armory board to construct,
maintain and operate a sports stadium for the enjoyment of the people
of the District of Columbia. The armory board subsequently entered
into a thirty-year exclusive lease of the stadium with the Washington
Redskins football team. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that, notwithstanding the governmental sta-
tus of the armory board, the anticompetitive activity engaged in was
not sanctioned by Congress and was therefore subject to federal anti-
trust scrutiny.124 The Seventh Circuit, however, found Hecht to be too
factually remote to be controlling.12 5
The court also distinguished cases relied on by CU for the proposi-
tion that implied antitrust immunity is disfavored. These cases126 all
involved industries subject to federal regulatory commissions and
raised issues of implied exemption from antitrust liability based on
congressional regulatory statutes. Since there was no congressional
regulatory statute or federal regulatory commission governing AAFES,
the court found these cases inapposite. 27
Finally, the congressional enactments 28 cited by CU to indicate a
congressional awareness that AAFES was not synonymous with gov-
ernment were interpreted otherwise by the majority. 129 These enact-
123. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
124. Id at 947.
125. 632 F.2d at 691.
126. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964) (United
States brought civil suit for Sherman Act violations based on attempted bank merger); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (United States brought civil suit for alleged
Clayton Act violations based on acquisition of stock and assets of natural gas company); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (United States brought civil suit under
Sherman and Clayton Acts to enjoin proposed bank merger); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341 (1963) (corporate broker-dealer in municipal bonds brought Sherman Act suit for wrong-
ful termination of private wire connections between broker-dealers). For an overview of express
and implied immunity standards for federally regulated industries, see Note, TheAntitrust Immu-
nity Doctrine and United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers. Stepping on Otter
Tail, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 387 (1976).
127. 632 F.2d at 692.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 8171 (1976) (special statutory treatment of civilian employees of non-appropri-
ated fund instrumentalities disabled in the course of employment); 4 U.S.C. §§ 104-110 (state
authorized to tax gasoline sold at exchanges); 31 U.S.C. § 724a (AAFES, not the United States,
must pay any damages arising out of its contracts); 10 U.S.C. §§ 4779(c), 9779(c) (1976) (no money
appropriated by Congress for the Army and Air Force shall be spent for exchanges).
129. 632 F.2d at 692.
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ments, the court stated, merely indicated that Congress had the power
to make special provisions applicable to AAFES operations and exer-
cised that power as it deemed necessary.1 30
Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded from its consideration of
AAFES' purposes and operations, the legislative history of the Act, in-
cluding the rejected amendments, and Standard Oil v. Johnson that
AAFES was a government instrumentality entitled to immunity from
the Act. This conclusion led to the holding that the secretaries also
were immune. 31 Since the secretaries were not held liable under the
Act, the majority inferred that Cummins likewise could not be liable
for antitrust violations. They reasoned that to hold otherwise would
permit a collateral attack upon the grant of governmental immunity for
the secretaries. 32 In essence, if a private wholesaler could be held lia-
ble for sales to AAFES, then no wholesaler would price discriminate in
favor of AAFES. Therefore, if Cummins were held liable, the recogni-
tion of government immunity. for AAFES officials would be illusory.133
The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Swygert agreed with the majority
that AAFES is an instrumentality of the United States. However, he
disagreed with both the district court's conclusion that AAFES enjoys
sovereign immunity from the antitrust laws134 and the majority's con-
clusion that AAFES is entitled to immunity from the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. He pointed out that the Parker v. Brown state action doctrine
and its progeny have made it clear that "it is not every governmental
130. Id
131. At the outset of its opinion, the majority said that it was necessary to examine the pur-
poses and operations of AAFES because Judge Baker had premised his dismissal of the suit
against the secretaries on the finding that AAFES was a part of the government. Id at 683. The
majority inferred here that if AAFES was found to be a part of the government then the secretar-
ies were immune. ld at 692.
132. Id at 692-93.
133. The majority relied on Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967), which established the principle that if the purchaser were im-
mune, then the seller also would be immune. In Logan Lanes, the owner of a private bowling
alley brought an action for price discrimination against a bowling equipment manufacturer for
selling equipment to a state university at a reduced price. The university could not be named as a
defendant because the Act specifically exempts purchases of supplies for their own use by certain
non-profit institutions such as universities. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1976). The Logan court concluded
that the manufacturer was also exempt from liability under the Act because the benefits of lower
prices to exempt purchasers would be illusory if sellers were not free to offer lower prices under
the Act. 378 F.2d at 215-16.
134. The district court's finding that AAFES enjoyed sovereign immunity would imply that
AAFES is immune from the Sherman and Clayton Acts as well. See text accompanying notes
162-68 itfra.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
act that points a path to an antitrust shelter."' 135
Judge Swygert first discussed City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co. ,136 in which the Supreme Court refused to extend the
Parker state action doctrine to the plaintiff cities 37 which owned and
operated electric utility systems on the basis that they performed a
business rather than a governmental function. Judge Swygert pointed
out that the Court had rejected the cities' contention that because their
purpose was public service, not private profit, they should be granted a
Parker state action exemption. 38 In so doing, the Court had reasoned
that every business enterprise, public or private, when operating its
business in furtherance of its own goals, will undoubtedly have an im-
pact upon other individuals and business enterprises and will some-
times interrelate with these other entities as competitors.1 39
Judge Swygert found many similarities between Champaign- Ur-
bana News Agency, Inc. and City of Lafayette. He noted that both
AAFES and the cities were instrumentalities of government, but not
themselves the sovereign; both were engaged in proprietary rather than
governmental activities;' 4° and both of their operations had impact on
other individuals and businesses. In addition, AAFES, like the cities,
was not violating the antitrust laws "pursuant to a government policy
to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service."' 4'
In fact, the AAFES procurement manual emphasized compliance with
the antitrust laws.142
Judge Swygert's response to the contradicting interpretations of
AAFES' purchasing policies held by CU and the secretaries differed
from that of the majority. He indicated that the more logical interpre-
135. 632 F.2d at 693, (quoting Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1294 (5th Cir. 1971)). For examples of similar reasoning, see California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
136. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
137. Plaintiffs were various cities that were organized under the laws of Louisiana. These laws
granted them the power to own and operate electric utility systems both within and beyond their
city limits. 435 U.S. at 391.
138. Id at 393.
139. Id at 403.
140. 632 F.2d at 693. A persuasive argument could be made that even though AAFES activi-
ties appear to be proprietary, its main purpose is to provide inexpensive supplies to military per-
sonnel and thereby enable the government to keep military salaries low. Keeping military salaries
low would appear to be a purely governmental function and would certainly have an effect on the
public treasury.
141. Id at 694. It could be argued, however, that the goal of AAFES to provide inexpensive
goods to military personnel is a federal mandate which conflicts with the Act. See text accompa-
nying notes 172-77 infra.
142. 632 F.2d at 694.
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tation was that the regulations required the lowest price contracting
consistent with the antitrust laws.143 For this proposition, he relied on
Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 44where the Court indicated
that unless there was congressional policy to the contrary, immunity
from state regulation was not to be inferred even though the govern-
ment was required to contract with the lowest responsible bidder. 45
Judge Swygert then reviewed Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 146 where
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had
analyzed cases involving claims of state and federal government anti-
trust activity. The Hecht court found that the antitrust laws do not
restrict anticompetitive activity directed by the United States govern-
ment since the antitrust laws are not constitutional charters.' 47 The
court in Hecht indicated, however, that the federal antitrust policies
have been so firmly established that the proper inquiry is not which
valid governmental action is immune from the antitrust laws, but
rather to what extent Congress has adopted a policy contrary to, or
inconsistent with, the antitrust laws. 48 Since Judge Swygert found no
federal policy displacing competition with regulation or monopoly
public service, he concluded that AAFES should not enjoy immunity
from antitrust liability, for to hold all valid government action immune
would be "a much too talismanic approach where scrupulous distinc-
tions are called for."' 149
The court in Hecht further found that Congress had not intended
to exempt the armory board from the antitrust laws because it was "in
the nature of a private venture,"' 50 and because some of its contracts
required competitive bidding.15' Judge Swygert found similarity
143. Id
144. 318 U.S. 261 (1943). Penn Dairies involved an action brought by the Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission to determine if the minimum state price regulation of milk could be applied
to a dealer selling milk to the United States.
145. Id at 275.
146. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
147. Id at 935.
148. Id The Hecht court laid out relevant criteria which would help determine whether Con-
gress had adopted a policy contrary to or inconsistent with the antitrust laws:
[R]elevant criteria would include the specific language of the congressional statute in-
volved, any legislative history which would throw light on the congressional intent, the
relative importance of the governmental action which is asserted to override antitrust
policy, whether the governmental agency is required to take into consideration the possi-
ble anticompetitive effect of its actions, whether the agency is required to adhere to a
clearly defined and restricted statutory directive, and to what extent the agency's actions
are subject to judicial review.
Id at 935.
149. Id at 934.
150. Id at 946.
151. Id at 945.
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between Hecht and Champaign- Urbana News Agency, Inc. and inferred
from Hecht's analysis of state and federal antitrust cases that the
Parker state action doctrine was applicable to the federal government
and its instrumentalities. 5 2
Rather than accept the majority's distinction between Paul v.
United States' 53 and Champaign- Urbana News Agency, Inc. , 54 Judge
Swygert emphasized the significance of what the Supreme Court had
determined in Paul-that no federal policy immunized a post exchange
in its retail operations from compliance with state economic regula-
tions.' 55 Since the Court had not immunized AAFES from state eco-
nomic regulations in Paul, Judge Swygert found it anomalous that the
majority could immunize AAFES from federal economic regula-
tions.156 In sum, Judge Swygert relied on the Parker state action doc-
trine, Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. ,57 and Paul v. United States 5 8 to
conclude that not every governmental act is sheltered from the antitrust
laws. Judge Swygert concluded that AAFES could engage in anticom-
petitive activity without antitrust liability only when Congress or a fed-
eral policy has expressly exempted its actions.
ANALYSIS
Majority Opinion
The district court had reasoned that AAFES, as an arm of the
United States government, enjoys sovereign immunity from the Act.
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, after a consideration of
AAFES' purposes and operations, concluded that AAFES is a govern-
ment instrumentality entitled to immunity from the Act. Rather than
finding that AAFES enjoys sovereign immunity, the Seventh Circuit's
language indicates another result.
The crucial distinction is that the majority indicated that AAFES
was entitled to immunity rather than it enjoyed sovereign immunity.
Immunity is defined as an exemption, 59 while sovereign immunity pre-
cludes a litigant from suing a sovereign or a party with sovereign attrib-
152. 632 F.2d at 694. It could be inferred from this conclusion that only anticompetitive activ-
ity directed and supervised by the federal government would be exempt from antitrust liability.
153. 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
154. See text accompanying notes 115-19 supra.
155. 632 F.2d at 695.
156. Id Judge Swygert then indicated that he would have remanded the case for trial on the
AAFES immunity issue.
157. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
158. 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
159. BLACK'S LAW DIcroNAuY 676 (5th ed. 1979).
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utes unless the sovereign consents to suit. 60
To determine whether a party has sovereign attributes the Dugan v.
Rank' 6' test is applied. Under the Dugan test, a suit is against the
sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public
treasury or domain or interfere with the public administration, or if the
effect of the judgment would be to restrain the government from acting
or compel it to act.' 62
Champaign- Urbana News Agency, Inc. involved AAFES, which is
a non-appropriated fund activity; therefore, judgments against it are
not paid out of the public treasury, but are paid from AAFES' own
profits.' 63 Moreover, a suit against AAFES does not involve interfer-
ence with public administration because AAFES' sales are exclusively
to military personnel and AAFES' purchases are from private vendors.
Finally, although this suit might restrain AAFES from entering into
future contracts which violate the antitrust laws, it realistically would
not restrain AAFES from contracting' 64 for its supplies nor specifically
compel it to act. Thus, the majority properly concluded that this suit
was not against a party with sovereign attributes as those attributes are
measured under the Dugan test.
Rather than analyzing this suit under the sovereign immunity doc-
trine, the Seventh Circuit resolved the issue of AAFES' liability by
looking at the Act's legislative history and the purposes and operations
of AAFES. The legislative history of the Act indicated that purchases
by the government were not subject to its restrictions. The court's re-
view of the purposes, operations and organization of AAFES enabled
the court to classify AAFES as a federal government purchaser. From
these two premises, the majority then inferred that AAFES as a govern-
ment purchaser was entitled to an implied statutory exemption from
the Act.
The court correctly concluded that AAFES was entitled to an im-
plied statutory exemption rather than to sovereign immunity. First, a
160. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.
161. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
162. See note 55 supra.
163. Although not addressed by either the Court or the parties, an argument could be made
that AAFES' liability under the Act would expend itself, at least indirectly, on the public treasury.
It could be advanced that in order to provide funds for possible antitrust litigation, AAFES would
need to increase prices. These increased prices would, in effect, diminish the purchasing power of
military personnel. In consequence, military salaries would have to be increased in order to re-
store to the military the same level of AAFES benefits and services. Since military salaries come
from appropriated funds, the public treasury would be affected.
164. AAFES had contracted for supplies with CU for twenty-two years without violating or, at
least, without being accused of violating the antitrust laws and could have continued to do so.
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finding of an implied statutory exemption avoids the need to determine
whether lower and more diverse governmental agencies (such as
AAFES) enjoy sovereign immunity. 165 Second, this implied exemption
is limited to the Robinson-Patman Act, a single statute, whereas a find-
ing that AAFES enjoys sovereign immunity would have had a wide-
reaching effect. If sovereign, AAFES would then be immune from all
governmental enactments including the Sherman and Clayton Acts un-
less Congress were to specify otherwise. By limiting its holding to an
exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act, the court was able to avoid
a determination of AAFES' sovereign immunity. Third, since there
was already some legislative history indicating that government pro-
curement was exempt, the court needed to show only that AAFES was
a government operation rather than a private enterprise to conclude
that AAFES is entitled to the exemption. 166
The majority's opinion, however, did not provide limits or guide-
lines for determining whether all government agencies or instrumental-
ities or only particular ones are immune from the Act. Whether other
federal, state or municipal instrumentalities are subject to the Act's re-
strictions remains uncertain. At best, the majority developed a test to
determine whether AAFES was exempt. The court's test indicates that
before a government instrumentality is entitled to immunity or exemp-
tion from the Act, consideration must be given to the instrumentality's
purposes and operations. 67
This test is similar to the test the Seventh Circuit previously uti-
lized to determine whether a municipal park district was immune
under the Parker state action doctrine. In Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway
and Park District of Peoria,168 the city park district terminated the pro
shop concessions of five professional golfers when the golfers refused to
raise concession fees pursuant to the park district's conspiracy to fix
retail prices. The Seventh Circuit found no state mandate for the city
park district's anticompetitive activity and refused to extend Parker
165. See Sheehan v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service, 619 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980).
166. The Seventh Circuit determined that this case involved an issue of statutory interpreta-
tion rather than sovereign immunity. In so doing, the court did not have to apply the Dugan test.
167. The court scrutinized AAFES' purposes and operations before concluding that AAFES
was entitled to immunity from the Act:
AAFES is obviously not just a big cut rate store operated by the government to make
life difficult for civilian merchants. To try to separate AAFES from our military forces is
to who.lly ignore all its unique features distinguishing it from private enterprise ....
AAFES is a very important and integral part of our military structure providing a much
needed service to military personnel around the world.
632 F.2d 680, 692.
168. 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), reconsidered andajrd
as to antitrust issues, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
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state action immunity. 69 The court concluded that the park district
was merely a subordinate unit of government not entitled to all the def-
erence accorded to the state itself.1 70 The court reasoned that "an ade-
quate state mandate for anticompetitive activities of subordinate
governmental units 'may be demonstrated by explicit language in state
statutes, or may be inferredfrom the nature of thepowers and duties given
to a particular government entity.' ",171 Thus, in Kurek, the city park
district was not entitled to immunity because an adequate state man-
date allowing anticompetitive activity could not be inferred from the
nature of the powers and duties given to it. The city park district had
not been given the power to conspire to fix the concession prices. 72
Under a similar analysis applied to the federal government,
AAFES would be entitled to immunity because an adequate federal
mandate allowing anticompetitive activity could be inferred from the
nature of the purposes, operations, powers and duties given to AAFES
by the federal government. The majority indicated that obtaining the
lowest-priced goods furthered AAFES' purpose and duty of providing
the military with low-priced merchandise and services. 173
Notwithstanding that Kurek involved the Parker state action doc-
trine, the majority in Champaign- Urbana News Agency, Inc. apparently
followed the same reasoning before extending immunity to AAFES.
The majority correctly found a federal mandate permitting anticompe-
titive activity in its assessment of the purpose, organization, operation
and importance of AAFES and in the treatment accorded AAFES by
the legislative and executive branches.
Under the Parker state action doctrine, the presence of an ade-
quate state mandate entitles the instrumentality, agency or program to
an exemption from antitrust liability. Similarly, under Champaign- Ur-
bana News Agency, Inc., finding an adequate federal mandate through
a consideration of the government instrumentality's purposes and oper-
ations entitles the instrumentality to immunity from the Act.
Dissenting Opinion
The majority affirmed the district court's result, but for a different
reason. This prompted Judge Swygert, in his partial dissent, to indicate
specifically that he disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion that
169. 557 F.2d at 590.
170. Id at 589.
171. Id at 590 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
172. Id
173. 632 F.2d at 684.
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AAFES enjoys sovereign immunity from the antitrust laws. 174 In addi-
tion, Judge Swygert also disagreed with the result reached by the ma-
jority.
Judge Swygert's argument relied heavily on the Parker progeny
and Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. 175 These cases, however, involved vio-
lations of the Sherman Act, which restricts activities different from
those governed by the Robinson-Patman Act. The basic purpose of the
Sherman Act is to protect free competition by preventing incipient mo-
nopolization and preserving competition in the market place. The pur-
pose of the Robinson-Patman Act, on the other hand, is to protect
small merchants from the power of the larger chain retailers. Judge
Swygert's dissent failed to discuss and establish the validity of using
Sherman Act cases with respect to an issue of immunity from the
Robinson-Patman Act. In fact, commentators have stressed the diver-
gence of these two regulatory enactments. 76 Judge Swygert's argu-
ment that AAFES is more like a private venture than a governmental
instrumentality entitled to sovereign immunity 177 would have been
more persuasive had the majority concluded that AAFES enjoyed sov-
ereign immunity, because AAFES' sovereign immunity would have
also implied that AAFES was not subject to the Sherman Act. Indeed,
a future action similar to Champaign- Urbana News Agency, Inc. claim-
ing Sherman Act violations might circumvent the immunity bar by
raising Judge Swygert's argument.
However, the majority concluded that AAFES is only entitled to
an exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act. Thus, Champaign-Ur-
bana News Agency, Inc. is not an attempt to shelter all government
activity from the antitrust laws. Instead, it is merely a determination
that AAFES, a unique and specialized federal instrumentality, is enti-
tled to exemption from an antitrust law amendment which was in-
tended to restrict the power of larger private chain retailers rather than
AAFES-like government instrumentalities. It appears to be a logical
conclusion, since AAFES is neither attempting to monopolize the retail
market nor accepting price discrimination in order to lower its prices to
drive smaller merchants out of business. The goal of AAFES is simply
to purchase goods as cheaply as possible and pass this savings on to
174. Id at 693.
175. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
176. See generally, L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 678 (1977); Adelman, Effective Competition and
the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1327-50 (1948); Bums, The Anti-Trust Laws and the
Regulation ofPrice Competition, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 301 (1937).
177. See text accompanying notes 137-52 supra.
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government military personnel in the form of lower prices or increased
welfare and recreational activities. Judge Swygert's dissent was mis-
guided in its attempt to analogize AAFES' liability under the Robin-
son-Patman Act to that of other governmental agencies under the
Sherman Act.
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
The majority's test for government instrumentality exemption
from the Act requires a case-by-case analysis to determine which in-
strumentalities are entitled to exemption. This unfortunately leaves
other federal, state and municipal instrumentalities in a precarious po-
sition. If the purposes and operations of these instrumentalities are not
sufficiently governmental to entitle them to exemption from the Act,
they could be subject to treble damages actions. Before making
purchases on behalf of their instrumentalities, government officials will
be required either to flatly refuse vendor bids which offer tempting
price discriminations or risk an antitrust action based on price discrimi-
nation brought by disappointed vendors.
A case-by-case determination of instrumentality liability or ex-
emption not only places government procurement officials in a precari-
ous position, but will also result in excessive litigation costs. Since the
courts can rule only on the fact situations of cases brought before them,
it would seem more prudent and expedient for the legislative branch to
reexamine this area of the law and properly establish general limits to
the Act's restrictions upon government instrumentalities.
One possible legislative solution would be a statutory exemption
for government purchases similar to section 13c of the Act 17 which
exempts "purchases of their supplies for their own use by schools, col-
leges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals and charitable
institutions not operated for profit."" 79 The legislature could commis-
sion a study to determine whether government instrumentality exemp-
tion would thwart the purposes of the Act. Those instrumentalities
which would present price discrimination concerns similar to those
found in the private competitive market could be specifically subjected
to the Act's restrictions.
However, since it does not appear that government instrumentali-
ties engage in price discrimination in order to threaten the existence of
178. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1976). See note 31 supra.
179. Id
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small businesses,180 a general statutory exemption for government in-
strumentality purchases should be enacted. Not only would such an
exemption relieve government procurement officials, the bench and the
bar from the necessity of determining each instrumentality's purposes
and operations, it would also enable the legislature to clarify whether
government instrumentalities are immune only from the Act or
whether they enjoy sovereign immunity from all federal antitrust laws.
CONCLUSION
In Champaign- Urbana News Agency, Inc., the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that an Army and Air Force Exchange Service is entitled to
immunity from the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority based its de-
cision on Standard Oil of California v. Johnson, which indicated that
post exchanges were government instrumentalities entitled to govern-
mental immunities, and on the legislative history of the Act which indi-
cated it was not applicable to government purchases.
In contrast, Judge Swygert's dissent found support for possible
AAFES antitrust liability in the Parker v. Brown state action progeny,
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., and Paul v. United States. From these
cases, Judge Swygert found that not every governmental act would lead
to antitrust immunity. He concluded that whether the commercial and
proprietary activities of AAFES were entitled to any immunity from
the Act was a determination best made at trial rather than as a matter
of law.
The Seventh Circuit modified the district court's finding of sover-
eign immunity from the Robinson-Patman Act to an implied statutory
exemption from the Act. In its analysis of the Act, the court found that
Congress had expressly exempted purchases by certain non-profit insti-
tutions. It would appear that government purchases should also be ex-
pressly exempted since the government, like the exempt non-profit
institutions, is not the type of price discriminator the Act was meant to
restrict. Through an express exemption for government purchases,
Congress could clarify the appropriate limits of antitrust liability of
government instrumentalities and thereby relieve the courts from piece-
meal, costly and possibly inconsistent holdings.
FRED A. SMITH
180. See, e.g., General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W.D.
Ky. 1941), affd on other grounds, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942).
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